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Abstract
We are neither economists nor academic scholars; however we are students of the markets
having experienced the credit crunch on the front lines as institutional investors from a
country that is neither in Europe nor is the United States (i.e. Canada). The credit crunch
and related “Great Recession” have instilled havoc on the global economy. The crisis has
led to a large contraction of the real economy of approximately 1% of real GDP in 2009,
which could have been considerably larger without massive government sponsored stim-
ulus plans. In the aftermath of every crisis there are always lessons to be learned. The main
takeaways from the most recent credit crunch centre on risk distortion, the flawed coun-
terparty risk offset model, excessive leverage, inherent conflicts of interest and the legacy
of creating “too big to fail” financial institutions. As financial markets appear to have
stepped back from the brink of destruction, we believe that there are three major conse-
quences that we are currently facing. First the global financial system will likely be irrevo-
cably changed by new regulations. Second, on the economic front, we are facing a
post-recession period of relatively low global growth. Third, developing countries’ govern-
ments are facing massive budget deficits and their debt/GDP levels are likely unsustainable
and therefore requiring severe fiscal austerity programs. 
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 1. Introduction
We are neither economists nor academic scholars; however we are students of the
markets having experienced the credit crunch on the front lines as institutional in-
vestors from a country that is neither in Europe nor is the United States (i.e.
Canada). The credit crunch and related “Great Recession” have instilled havoc on
the global economy. The crisis has led to a large contraction of the real economy
of approximately 1% of real GDP in 2009, which could have been considerably larger
without massive government sponsored stimulus plans. Peak-to-trough output in
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies
has fallen approximately 4%. Monetary policy has been loosened dramatically and
direct support for the financial system has totaled approximately a quarter of global
GDP. Writedowns in the banking sector through the first half of 2009 amounted
to US$1.3 trillion and will likely total US$2.8 trillion by the end of the crisis accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the aftermath of every crisis there
are always lessons to be learned. The main takeaways from the most recent credit
crunch centre on risk distortion, the flawed counterparty risk offset model, excessive
leverage, inherent conflicts of interest and the legacy of creating “too big to fail” fi-
nancial institutions. We will expand on each of the causes over the next several
pages, detail some of the consequences and then provide our preferred “solution”
in the conclusion.
Before we discuss the more immediate triggers of the credit crunch that we outline
below, it is also important to focus for a moment on what is in our opinion the
root cause of the Great Recession: an excessive easy monetary policy that began in
the United States in the mid 1990’s. Following the collapse of Long Term Capital
Management in 1998 and again following the Tech Wreck in the early 2000’s, the
U.S. Federal Reserve aggressively lowered interest rates and maintained this accom-
modative stance for a long period of time. This policy was allowed to be pursued
due to a monetary policy model based on a linkage between the printing of money
and inflation. This stance was motivated by concerns from Chairman Alan
Greenspan and the Federal Reserve that the U.S. faced the risk of deflation. The
basis of this belief was set out in a Federal Reserve paper issued in June 2002, “Pre-
venting Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990’s.” The report con-
cludes that deflation can be very difficult to predict in advance. In consequence, as
interest rates and inflation rates move closer to zero, monetary policy perhaps
should respond not only to baseline forecasts of future activity and prices, but also
to the special downside risks, in particular, the possibility of deflation. This fear led
to a deviation from the regular way of conducting monetary policy and consequently
the relatively low interest rates led first to the commodity price bubble and then to
the housing bubble. 
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In a bit of revisionist history, Alan Greenspan has recently stated that central banks
were innocent and impotent bystanders in a global macroeconomic shift. The rise in
desired global saving relative to desired investment caused a global decline in long-
term rates which became de-linked from the short-term rates that central bankers
control. Greenspan further stated that it was long-term interest rates that galvanized
home asset prices, not the overnight rates of central banks. This is difficult in some
ways to grasp as long-term rates are related to short-term rates; the yield curve is in
essence a projection of a stream of short-term rates. Greenspan’s view ties in with
current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s theory of a “global saving glut”.
Bernanke has stated that since the mid 1990’s a combination of diverse forces created
a significant increase in the global supply of saving which helps to explain both the
increase in the U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-term
interest rates. The ample supply of foreign savings combined with a low U.S. personal
saving rate, large U.S. government deficits and high productivity gains combined to
produce a huge current account deficit. There vast quantities of money in the system
resulting from this large current account deficit was seeking investment projects and
found a home in the housing, stock and commodities markets.
Contrary to Bernanke’s view that excessive foreign savings led to low interest rates,
our opinion is that the money creation inflation linkage was outmoded due to a
switch from a closed economy (where it was effective) to an open global economy.
This led to excessive money printing which in turn led to asset price inflation, a phe-
nomena that occurred in spite of core CPI levels at around 2%. Under Greenspan, the
U.S. Federal Reserve chose to focus almost solely on core inflation (excluding the
volatile sectors of food and energy). The reasoning behind a focus on the narrower
core inflation rate is that most changes in food and energy prices are temporary and
reversible, and therefore can be ignored as threats to inflation. However, one caveat
applies: if higher energy prices or higher food prices persist, eventually, they are likely
to spill through into the core inflation rate because fuel surcharges and higher trans-
portation costs boost prices to suppliers, who then pass through the elevated costs
to final consumers in an effort to maintain profit margins. Core inflation was dis-
torted by excessive low cost production from the Far East. China and India supplied
low-cost goods and services to the United States and in return demanded non-core
goods (raw inputs such as oil, natural gas and metals as well as food) in return. As a
result core inflation has persistently underpredicted headline inflation which has been
running ahead of the Fed’s comfort zone for most of the 2000’s. 
All financial bubbles require a substitute of money to their equivalent store of value,
this played out in the 1990’s with the dot com tech wreck, with commodities in the
mid 2000’s and with real estate in the later 2000’s. The focus on the fear of deflation
led to the linkage and perpetuation of a dislocation between financial assets and in-le
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flation. In other words as long as CPI was controlled, a bubble could not be recog-
nized. The eventual extremes that the excessive creation of money alternatives created
are detailed in the following pages.
 2. Securitization
The advent of the originate to distribute model of securitization led not only to a mas-
sive growth of the market but also provided financial institutions with an effective
way to move risk off their balance sheets while collecting fees for doing so. It also led
to a misalignment of incentives in the process. In the United States, from the early
1990s through 2008, agency mortgage backed securities surged by 670% to total
US$3.55 trillion, outstanding assets backed securities (ABS) ballooned from US$75
billion to US$2.7 trillion and outstanding Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)
increased by 69% to US$1 trillion. At the peak of the housing market large financial
institutions securitized between 40-60% of family residential loans. 
Securitization is the process of turning cash flows from a pool of non-tradeable assets
such as residential mortgages, credit card borrowings, car loans and leases, and equip-
ment trade receivables, into tradeable debt instruments. It was an effective way for fi-
nancial institutions to move liabilities off their balance sheets. Under the originate to
distribute model there is a reduced incentive for the banks to develop a rigourous screen-
ing process of potential borrowers since the banks become separated from the conse-
quences of the end borrower’s default. In the end, no party was found to have a stake
in the long-run performance of the underlying loan. What also made it an attractive
model was that fees were collected in every aspect of the process from the mortgage
originator to the home appraisal agent to the banker/dealer who sliced and diced the
mortgages into structured products to the rating agencies who rated them. It seems
everyone was a winner except possibly the unsuspecting buyer who ended up with a
mortgage that he/she could not afford when housing prices declined. It was a big win
for the financial institutions that saw an increase in Return on Equity (ROE) and a re-
duction in the risk-weighted assets as they moved liabilities off their balance sheets. 
With financial innovation and engineering the underlying assets of securitizations be-
came more opaque and complex (including collateralized loan obligations, collater-
alized debt obligations, leveraged super senior tranches of investment grade corporate
credit default swaps (CDS), uninsured residential mortgages, commercial mortgage
backed securities etc.) and also involved a large degree of leverage. Most often it also
involved a monoline insurer who guaranteed the CDO structure to ensure they
achieved an AAA rating. As the complexity of the transactions increased there was
also a corresponding decrease in the amount of information received on the under-
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lying assets. Under SEC rules a special purpose entity (the structure for securitizations)
that issues fixed income is not an investment company and therefore exempt from
registration under the 1940 Investment Companies Act. As an unregistered entity,
they are prospectus exempt and do not have to file quarterly and annual financial
statements. Information available to investors was therefore asymmetric. They became
what Gary Gorton, Professor at the Yale School of Management, termed “informa-
tionally insensitive debt securities.” Issuers did not always disclose material informa-
tion both at issue and on an ongoing basis. For the most part, the investor was reliant
solely on lagging reports from rating agencies to assess the creditworthiness of a deal
on an ongoing basis. The fact that it took a team of lawyers, accountants and invest-
ment experts in Canada more than a year to untangle the complicated and inter-
twined web of non-bank sponsored Asset Backed Commercial Paper demonstrates
the complexity and opacity of the structures that were created. 
The main point is that an increasingly long chain of short-term lending or financial
layering was supporting speculative positions in long-term assets with increasing lever-
age. The system would have been extremely fragile and subject to collapse even if the
mortgage assets had been perfectly sound, which they were not. The securitization
model was dependent on the “sophisticated” investors who acquired the structured
securities. These investors ranged from institutional investors (asset managers, pen-
sion funds, endowments funds etc.) to financial institutions who used the highly rated
securities as collateral for repo and derivatives trading. Under Basel II regulations
these financial institutions had to post only minimal collateral against AAA rated se-
curities holdings. It was also curious as to why investors were demanding so little
compensation (in terms of yield) for risk. The securitization market collapsed in Au-
gust 2007, as concern over the concentration of U.S. subprime mortgages in securi-
tized products led to a buyers’ strike. New issue securitization dried up and the ABCP
market crashed. Financial institutions were forced to manage previously securitized
assets on their own balance sheets, support some of the structured investment vehicles
(appropriately short-formed to SIVs) and faced losses and writedowns on their own
portfolio of structured products holdings. 
 3. Counterparty Offset Model
Similar to the securitization market, the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market
exploded over the past decade growing by approximately 665% to total US$614.7
trillion notional outstanding at year-end 2009, according to the Bank of International
Settlements. The majority of the contracts are related to interest rates (65%) with for-
eign exchange (9%) and credit default swaps contracts (9.5%) being the next largest
categories. Derivatives trading in the over-the-counter market is neither registered norle
ss
o
ns
 a
nd
 c
o
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ev
o
lv
in
g 
20
07
-?
c
re
di
t 
c
ru
nc
h.
  
C
or
ne
il, 
B
. L
. a
nd
 M
cN
am
ar
a,
 S
. 
168
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
systematically reported to the market. There is also no regulatory responsibility for
the market and therefore no enforcement of market abuse. Transparency is also sig-
nificantly lacking in the market as trading of OTC derivatives is bilateral, so no one
participant knows the identity of traders or clients, the size or price of orders or the
size of the market in aggregate. 
The real problem in the derivatives market was the concentration of counterparties. Ac-
cording to the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation data, banks and dealers are
the dominant counterparties to most credit derivatives contracts and account for ap-
proximately 90% of the notional outstandings. The counterparty risk in the derivatives
market turned into systemic risk because the standard bilateral arrangement of this con-
tract did not take into account the exposure of other buyers to the swaps and a lack of
transparency masked the exposure to expected credit defaults of counterparties. The fi-
nancial engineering that was believed to hedge risks would have worked effectively if in-
vestors had faced shocks that were uncorrelated with those of their counterparties.
Declines in asset and house prices affected all investors in a similar fashion inflicting ac-
tual and expected credit losses across the system. For the OTC market to work effectively
there is the underlying assumption that the counterparty must make good and that was
what broke down during the credit crisis. Financial institutions ceased to trust their coun-
terparties as they were unaware of what their counterparties’ risks were. Concerns about
the ability of companies to meet their obligations on derivatives contracts and the lack
of transparency about the risks associated with the underlying securities caused credit
markets to freeze. The interconnectedness and lack of transparency exacerbated the cri-
sis. Liquidity in the inter-bank market lending market dried up as banks declined to lend
to each other, even for an overnight period. Thereby a position that was deemed to be
hedged all of sudden became unhedged and exposed to market risk. 
The opacity of the market also created havoc as the original party that an entity may
have entered into a contract with most likely sold that position to another party, so
it was difficult to discern who the end counterparty actually was and what exactly the
total counterparty exposure one entity had to another. Employees of major financial
institutions spent the entire weekend that Lehman Brothers defaulted trying to figure
what their exact exposure to Lehman really was. 
The flaws in the counterparty offset model are highlighted by the ill fated fight by
Brooksley Born to attempt to regulate the derivatives market. As head of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, Born proposed the regulation of the over-the-
counter derivatives market in 1998. She was strenuously opposed by the “Committee
to Save the World” (then Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, former Assistant Sec-
retary of the Treasury, Lawrence Summers and former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan). At one point during the battle, Summers apparently called Born and
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said that he had 13 bankers in his office who believed that regulation was going to
cause the worst financial crisis since the end of World War II. Clearly, those 13 bankers
knew how complex the derivatives market was and were afraid of any attempt to im-
pose clarity on the opaque risks not to mention threatening a huge profit centre. 
We are currently seeing a repeat of the credit crisis playing out in the sovereign debt
crisis. European financial institutions have significant loan and derivatives exposure
to the problem countries of Europe (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). As
concern over those countries’ ability to manage their debts increase, once again liq-
uidity in the inter-bank lending market has become scarce. A country or a financial
institution may not be too big to fail but its derivatives obligations are too widely
spread to fail without serious global consequences. 
 4. Inherent conflicts interest
The credit crisis also brought to light significant conflicts of interest within the finan-
cial industry which likely led to a misalignment of decision making principles. The
conflicts were most noticeable in terms of political/regulatory appointments of people
who had close ties to the financial industry, renumeration policies of large financial
institutions and the credit rating process. 
In terms of compensation for financial institution employees, reward was decoupled
from risk. During the past twenty years, renumeration for the financial industry in-
creased significantly and seemed out of line versus the rest of the corporate world.
The real U.S. median household income has declined by approximately 4% between
2000 and 2008 whereas compensation at major Wall Street firms increased by ap-
proximately 340% over the same time period. 
The prospect of high compensation gave managers incentives to be shortsighted and
undertake excessive risk rather than act prudently. As remuneration was doled out
for the most part annually and in some cases quarterly, the focus was on driving short-
term profits and returns at the expense of focusing on whether in the long-term the
risk assumed was adequate. What became apparent was that risk management could
not be left to the banks themselves. For the most part their risk systems were directed
at their own competitive advantage and they were not motivated nor in a position to
adequately monitor the system as a whole. Risk management programs for the most
part assumed financial institution counterparties would make good and were mod-
eling for a rain shower type of event not a hurricane. Financial institutions relied too
heavily on Value at Risk (VAR) benchmarks which measure the amount an institution
stands to lose on its portfolio given an abnormal movement in market prices. Thesele
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models grossly underestimated what the truly abnormal was and were too reliant on
short runs of data; especially given we had experienced a fairly long stable period of
continuous growth, low inflation and growing employment. 
The ties between the political and central bank leaders that were in charge of im-
plementing policy solutions for the credit crisis had very close to ties to the very fi-
nancial institutions that they were endeavouring to on the one hand save and on
the other hand to punish for putting the global financial system at risk. The most
glaring of all collusions occur with the links to Goldman Sachs. The list of Goldman
Sachs alumni include: 
 Henry Paulson, former Secretary of the Treasury; 
 Neel Kashkari, who was in charge of the Troubled Asset Relief Program; 
 Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of Canada; 
 Mario Draghi, the Governor of the Bank of Italy;
 William Dudley, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
 Gary Gensler, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman; 
 Gene Sperling, the Top Aide the current Secretary of the Treasury;
 Adam Storch, Chief Operating Officer of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Enforcement Division; and 
 Jon Corzine, the former Governor of New Jersey.
Additionally, the Director of the White House’s National Economic Council, Lawrence
Summers worked for a hedge fund before rejoining the political world. While all the
one hand it can be argued that individuals with financial institutions backgrounds
can bring real world capital markets experience to their political assignments, on the
other hand it raises questions that they are possibly too biased in favour of Wall Street
and too predisposed not to cause too much pain to their former employers. Addi-
tionally, a number of former political and central bank officials have found employ-
ment in the financial world after their time in public service including: 
 Former Secretary of the Treasury during the Clinton Administration Robert
Rubin became a Director and briefly Chairman of the Board of CitiGroup; 
 Senator Phil Gramm who helped push through the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act Congress served as Vice Chairman of the Swiss Bank UBS; 
 Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman, currently acts as an advisor
to bond giant PIMCO and the hedge fund Paulson and Company; and 
 Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt is now a Goldman Sachs advisor. 
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Perhaps dreams of future employment in the financial industry tempers decisions
made while in power. There likely needs to be a blackout or timeout period between
when people can move between public service and finance and vice versa.
Two blatant conflict of interest occurred during the credit crisis. JP Morgan CEO
Jamie Dimon also sat on the Board of the New York Federal Reserve during the time
that the NY Fed was negotiating the terms of JP Morgan’s purchase of Bear Stearns.
As part of that deal the NY Fed provided a US$29 billion cushion for losses in the
Bear Stearn’s portfolio of toxic assets. In 2008, Stephen Friedman was Chairman
of the NY Fed and on the Board of Directors of Goldman Sachs. During his tenure
at the NY Fed, the Board negotiated a bailout of AIG which saw major CDS coun-
terparties to AIG including Goldman Sachs made whole on their contracts. 
The credit crisis also brought to light the flaw in the rating agency model for securi-
tizations. The rating agency analysts were not as independent and unbiased as they
were expected to be. They were intricately involved with the investment bankers in de-
signing and creating the several of tranches mortgage backed securities and collater-
alized debt obligations. The incentives for the rating agencies to do so were strong as
the fees the rating agencies received from rating a structured product were a multiple
of the fees they would receive from rating a traditional bond. Internal rating agency
emails that were disclosed in a recent Congressional hearing demonstrates the pres-
sure the analysts were under to win securitization business. One of the apparent flaws
in the analysis of the housing market in the U.S. was revealed that not enough histor-
ical data was used in simulating possible default scenarios, the models appeared to
be built on the assumption the housing prices never declined. 
The rating agencies should have played the role of questioning the data series em-
ployed rather than help in designating a data series that would yield a triple A rating.
These AAA ratings created a false sense of security for investors. According the highest
rating possible to high risk Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) containing
subprime mortgage risk and levered CDOs which turned out not to be safe invest-
ments was misleading. Data presented by a U.S. Senate Committee investigating the
credit rating agencies show that 91% of the AAA subprime RMBS securities issued in
2007, and 93% of those issued in 2006, have since been downgraded to below in-
vestment grade status. Additionally, 97% of the Option Adjustable Rate mortgage se-
curities issued in 2006 and 2007 have been downgraded to below investment grade.
The problem for the rating agencies is that they are paid by the issuer to provide the
rating as well as by the investor to subscribe to their rating services. The fees provided
by the issuer are far greater than the fees provided by the investor subscriber so al-
though the rating agencies strive to be independent, their compensation structure
could create pressure for bias towards the issuer.le
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The advent of credit default swaps also led to misalignment of interests between var-
ious holders during a solvency crisis. Traditionally, when a corporation was facing a
debt crisis and spiraling towards bankruptcy, the bondholders’ interests were for the
most part aligned with those of management in terms of a desire to restructure the
corporation and keep it a going concern. Under that scenario there is a better oppor-
tunity for the bondholder to recoup some of their investment. Contrarily, the holders
of CDS have an interest in forcing the company into bankruptcy as that would trigger
the payment of their protection contract. The amount of CDS outstanding on a cor-
porate entity far exceeded the underlying bonds outstanding.
 5. Too Big to Fail
The deregulation trend of the 1990s permitted banks to expand beyond their traditional
business of deposit taking and lending to become financial supermarkets acquiring in-
vestment dealers, insurance companies, and wealth mangers. During this period the
new financial institution became involved in riskier activities (derivatives trading), used
significant amounts of leverage to enhance returns, and became hugely profitable all
the while becoming more and more opaque. The deregulation trend also led to a con-
centration of the banking system. According to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis as the crisis commenced in the fall of 2007, 20 firms in the U.S. accounted for
approximately 80% of financial sector assets in the U.S., approximately 1/3 of this was
in bank holding companies and 2/3 were in non-bank financials such as Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, investment banks, insurance companies and thrifts. Therefore a large
portion of financial assets were not in the bank regulatory system and not under the
regulatory authority of the U.S. Federal Reserve. In Canada, the banking system and the
investment dealer network is concentrated in the hands of six major financial institutions. 
This deregulation trend has created institutions that are deemed to be “too big to fail.”
They could also be deemed “too interconnected to fail” or as University of Missouri Pro-
fessor William Black termed them “systemically dangerous institutions.” They are likely
also too big for their sovereign countries to save. If a money-centered bank is assumed
to be too big to fail and consequently receives government support there are many reper-
cussions. The most serious of which is that the resulting distortion in the flow of capital.
Depositors will naturally move funds towards the “rescued” bank because of the implied
continued government support, resulting in a loss of profit in the non-supported insti-
tution. This non-level playing field if allowed to persist will distort the concentration of
assets towards the supported institutions. On the flip side, this sense of too big to fail
also impacts the actions of the large financial institutions as the full or partial insurance
of bank creditors by the use of liquidity/bail out programs offered by governments and
central banks allows the banks to play an unfair game with the government’s money.
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When they take big bets and win they keep all the proceeds and when they take big bets
and lose, the costs are at least partially passed on to the government. It in effect distorts
a rational examination of risk management for the financial institution. The large size
of the financial institutions also contributes to contagion and systemic risk of counter-
party failure that we discussed above. The high degree of leverage meant that during
the credit crisis initial liquidity concerns gave quickly way to solvency concerns.
Arguably the banks were so complex that their own management teams could not
understand their own risks. In testifying before Congress, former CitiGroup CEO
Chuck Prince in speaking about the bank’s exposure to CDOs, stated that the com-
pany’s chief risk officer didn’t understand the risks, nor did Citigroup’s senior traders
and bankers. Former CitiGroup Chairman Robert Rubin said that he hadn’t even
heard of CDOs until the fall of 2007. If the management and Board of Directors of
the financial institutions can’t understand their risks it is hard to expect regulators,
creditors and investors to understand.
The question is who decides which institutions are supported and which are not. As
detailed in the book “Thirteen Bankers,” on Friday, March 27, 2009, thirteen CEOs of
the country’s largest financial institutions were summoned to Washington to meet
with President Obama. The banks required massive intervention from the government
and the U.S. Federal Reserve in terms of direct investment, government guarantees,
unlimited emergency lending and historically low interest rates to prevent bankruptcy
or forced merger. The U.S. government needed the 13 bankers because deregulation
had allowed the banks to grow so large and so opaque that their potential failure
threatened the security of the entire financial system. While these 13 benefitted from
rescue efforts, there have been 238 U.S. banks, savings banks and thrifts that have
failed and been seized by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation since 2008. 
 6. Consequences
As financial markets appear to have stepped back from the brink of destruction, we believe
that there are three major consequences that we are currently facing. First the global fi-
nancial system will likely be irrevocably changed by new regulations. Second, on the eco-
nomic front, we are facing a post-recession period of relatively low global growth. Third,
developing countries’ governments are facing massive budget deficits and their debt/GDP
levels are likely unsustainable and therefore requiring severe fiscal austerity programs.
A myriad of financial reforms are being proposed. The U.S. Senate has just passed a
comprehensive financial reform bill that is expected to be signed into law by the end of
the summer once it is reconciled with the broadly similar House of Representatives bill.le
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Among other things, the bill contains the “Volcker Rule” which prohibits bank holding
companies from proprietary trading. Julie Dickson, head of the Canadian financial reg-
ulator is advocating that banks raise contingent capital. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) with support of some members of the G-20, spearheaded by Germany and
France, are proposing a global bank tax as well as a “FAT” tax for excessive bank salaries
and/or bonuses. The IMF is also leading the push for a central counterparty clearing-
house for derivatives trading. Basel III is working on stricter capital restrictions and liq-
uidity requirements for global financial institutions. The crisis has shown that common
equity is the only form of capital that absorbs losses and therefore left many financial
institutions thinly capitalized and vulnerable to failure. Whatever form the final regula-
tions and reforms eventually take, financial institutions are most likely going to have to
delever, carry higher capital ratios, restrict some activities such as proprietary trading
and derivatives use, and in some cases return the monies that were injected into them
by sovereigns during the credit crisis. 
In a recent report on debt and deleveraging, the consultant McKinsey Global Institute
demonstrates that historic deleveraging episodes have been quite painful, on average
lasting six to seven years and reducing the ratio of debt to GDP by 25%. Empirically
deleveraging has followed nearly every major financial crisis in the past half century.
The consultant identified 45 episodes of deleveraging since the Great Depression in
which the ratio of debt relative to GDP declined and 32 of them followed a financial
crisis. Deleveraging in these cases sometimes occurred in the public sector, sometimes
in the private sector and sometimes in both. Across 32 episodes of post-financial crisis
deleveraging studied by McKinsey, the most common path following the crisis was a
prolonged period of financial austerity. While there was some growth in credit, the
pace was far below the pre-crisis rate of growth and was slower than nominal GDP
growth. Similarly, the savings rate increased as borrowers slowly reduced their debt.
The report found that the deleveraging process typically begins about two years after
the start of the financial crisis and economic recession. In the first two to three years
of the deleveraging process, real GDP declines by approximately 0.6% under the aus-
terity scenario and averages approximately positive 4.8% in the following 4-5 years
while the deleveraging process continues.
Total debt relative to GDP in the ten mature countries used in the McKinsey study
(Japan, United Kingdom, Spain, South Korea, France, Italy, Switzerland, United
States, Germany and Canada) have increased from approximately 200% of GDP in
1995 to over 300% by 2008. McKinsey points out that the majority of debt growth
has come not from the financial sector but from the household, business and gov-
ernment sectors. Total debt increased by approximately US$40 trillion from 2000 to
2008 in the mature markets studied and of that amount, financial institutions ac-
counted for only approximately US$11 trillion, or approximately 28%. We note that
lesso
ns and c
o
nsequences o
f the evo
lving 2007-?
c
redit c
runch.  C
orneil, B
. L. and M
cN
am
ara, S. 
175
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
McKinsey’s methodology does not include financial institution leverage and debt as-
sociated with derivatives and other off balance sheet instruments. 
Several features of the crisis today, including its global nature and the large projected
increases in government debt could delay the start of deleveraging process and result in
a longer period of debt reduction than in the past. In past episodes, increasing net ex-
ports was effective in supporting GDP growth during deleveraging. That is an unlikely
outcome currently given the global nature of the deleveraging required. It is unlikely that
all major economies can simultaneously increase their net exports. Additionally, current
projections of government debt in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United
States and Spain could offset reductions in private sector debt. McKinsey identifies the
risk that the mature economies may remain highly leveraged for a prolonged period cre-
ating a fragile and potentially unstable economic outlook over the next five to ten years. 
The McKinsey report coincides quite nicely with a recent report by economic profes-
sors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff entitled “Growth in a Time of Debt.” In
this report, the authors study the relationship between debt/GDP levels and GDP
growth. They conclude that the relationship between government debt and real GDP
growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90% of GDP, however above
90%, median growth rates fall by 1% and average growth falls considerably more.
When gross external debt reaches 60% of GDP, annual growth declines by approxi-
mately 2%. Additionally there is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation
and public debt levels for the advanced countries as a group. The main conclusion is
that seldom do countries grow their way out of deep debt burdens.
From data gleaned from the past two centuries, debt in excess of 90% has typically
been associated with mean growth of 1.7% versus 3.7% when debt is low (under 30%
of GDP) and compared with growth rates of 3% for when debt is between 30% and
90% of GDP. For the Canadian experience, the authours examined a data series for
the time period 1925-2009 and identified the following growth parameters: 
 Debt to GDP below 30%:  2.0% Annual Real GDP Growth.
 Debt to GDP between 30% and 60%: 4.5% Annual Real GDP Growth.
 Debt to GDP between 60% and 90%: 3.0% Annual Real GDP Growth.
 Debt to GDP over 90%: 2.2% Annual Real GDP Growth.
Canada’s public sector debt/GDP stood at 47% at year-end 2009. 
Using a benchmark of 14 earlier severe post-World War II financial crises, central gov-
ernment debt rises, on average, by approximately 86% within three years after the cri-
sis. This is consistent with conclusions from the McKinsey report. Additionally, privatele
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debt, in contrast to public debt, tends to shrink sharply for an extended period after
a financial crisis. Periods of sharp deleveraging tend to be associated with much lower
growth and higher unemployment. Private sector deleveraging will likely also dampen
growth in the medium term.
 7. Recommendation
The main responses to the credit crunch have been to try and improve liquidity and cap-
ital cushions for major financial institutions. Those supporting these reforms believe
that the fundamental problem is believed to have been the collapse in asset prices cre-
ated by the disappearance of market liquidity, rather than any inherent problem with
the assets themselves. If the assets are insolvent as are the institutions that hold them
this approach does not provide for the recovery of the system. As long as the policy is
to provide sufficient liquidity in the hope that asset prices will return to levels that allow
banks to remain solvent with minimum capital injections, there can and will be no mean-
ingful reform or regulation of the financial system. The U.S. reforms in their current form
fall short of any initiative designed to pre-emptively break up any big banks or impose a
tax on size in hopes of averting a future disaster, instead, the bills focus on mitigating
the disaster once it happens.
What we would desire to see is a break-up of the big global financial institutions that
are too big to fail. This becomes especially relevant as the sovereign crisis is bringing to
light that the banks are too big for the sovereigns to save without jeopardizing their own
solvency. On October 20, 2009, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King gave a speech
to Scottish business organizations where he advocated the “utilitization” of the banks.
Mr. King believes that banks incentives to manage risk and to increase leverage were dis-
torted by the implicit support or guarantee provided by government to creditors of
banks that were seen as too important to fail. Encouraging banks to take risks that ben-
efit the shareholders and employees when things go well and burdens the taxpayers
when they do not distorts the allocation of resources and the management of risk.
The Governor paraphrased Sir Winston Churchill that “never in the field of financial
endeavour has so much money been owed by so few to so many and so far with so
little real reform.” He believes that the difficulty with the capital cushion and contin-
gent capital reforms is that it is difficult to calculate how much will be required. He
believes that it is delusionary to think that appropriate regulation can ensure that
speculative activities do not result in a failure as the sheer creative imagination of the
financial sector to think up new ways of taking risk will in the end force us to confront
the too important to fail question. Mr. King built on the proposal first presented by
Paul Volcker to the G-30 to separate proprietary trading from retail banking. In other
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words to separate the functions of the bank that are “utility” in nature and need to
be regulated from those that can safely be left to the discipline of the market. 
Governor King hits on a very interesting point that we have ourselves debated on our
fixed income desk. Why do we have utility regulation? The Fair Return Standard, the
backbone of pipeline and utility regulation in Canada, basically takes a two-pronged
approach in its efforts to protect the ratepayer and to keep the regulated entity on
sound financial footing. Take for example, a gas distribution utility or an electric power
distributor that makes a strategic decision to actively engage in speculative energy trad-
ing to improve its Return on Equity (ROE). In the beginning it all goes well and their
derivative traders achieve significant returns for the company. Everyone is happy – the
shareholders, the ratepayers and management. Suppose then the 1 in 100 year storm
or 8th standard deviation event occurs and the majority of the company’s energy
trades blow up and the company incurs severe losses. The company passes these losses
onto the ratepayers in terms of higher electricity costs or heating costs. The customer
is forced to accept the higher rates, as the alternative is to freeze in the dark. The effects
spill over to the economy as in the face of higher costs, consumers curtail spending
and commercial/industrial customers curtail their business activities. Why you may
ask is this fair? Why should the consumer pay for the greediness and errors in risk
assessment made by the company? They shouldn’t and hence there are national and
provincial regulators to protect the ratepayers. The regulator approves the regulated
entity’s capital structure, sets its ROE, deems what investments/assets are appropriate
to be included in the company’s rate base, approves its capital expenditure budget and
reviews its annual operating expenses. In performance based ratemaking mechanisms,
the regulator ensures that the ratepayer and the company share in any cost savings. 
That is not to say that pipelines or utility companies do not engage in other activities
such as energy trading. They do, but it is outside the regulated entity and any gains /
losses affect the shareholder, not the ratepayer. In the early 2000’s, TransCanada Cor-
poration, the holding company for TransCanada PipeLines (regulated pipelines) and
NOVA Gas Transmission (regulated pipelines) in an effort to become the “Enron of
Canada” entered into a number of unregulated businesses (energy trading, merchant
power generation, electricity retailing etc.) that did not work out as well as the com-
pany expected. The company had to divest a number of businesses and ultimately cut
its dividend, which negatively impacted the share price. The shippers on the compa-
nies’ regulated pipelines were not forced to pay significant increases in their tolls to
cover the company’s non-regulated miscues. Translating this to the banking system,
it means that the “bricks and mortars” essential type service of borrowing and lending
of the banking system has to be freed up. In order to effect this there likely has to be
a separation of the opaque and excessively risky derivatives and proprietary trading
businesses as well as capital markets, wealth management and insurance type busi-le
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nesses from the deposit and lending business upon which the traditional economy
relies. This model would put risk where it belongs and insulate the depositor from
missteps in other areas of the bank. In essence what we, the fixed income desk, are
proposing is the reassembling of the pillars in Canada (i.e. breaking up investment
dealers, asset managers and deposit taking banks into separate and independent enti-
ties) and in the U.S. re-creating a modified Glass Steagall Act which prohibited bank
holding companies from owning other financial companies. 
Many economists and historians have pointed out, particularly Rogoff and Rein-
hart in “This Time is Different” that financial crises, recessions and defaults occur
throughout history. Their work confirms that crises frequently emanate from the
financial centres with transmission through interest rate shocks and commodity
price collapses and thus, the recent credit crisis is hardly unique. That is not to say
that we cannot learn from the previous crisis. If the large financial institutions are
not broken up, they will then carry a form of government insurance which is going
to encourage them to continue to assume risk and practically guarantees the next
“too big to fail” banking crisis. 
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